This research examines whether the fair value of mortgage servicing rights (MSRs) based on managerial inputs (Level 3) better reflects the cash flow and risk characteristics of the underlying assets than the fair value of MSRs based on market inputs (Level 2). Using mortgage servicing fees as a proxy for the underlying cash flows, we find that the valuation multiples for MSRs based on Level 3 inputs are more positively associated with the persistence of future servicing fees compared with the fair value of MSRs based on Level 2 inputs. We also document that only the valuation multiples based on Level 3 fair values are negatively associated with proxies for risk factors. Our results suggest that, although unobservable inputs are subject to managerial discretions, managers can generate higher quality fair value estimates than market inputs due to their information advantage, especially when the market for the underlying asset is inactive. 
Introduction
Improving our understanding of the financial reporting characteristics of fair value measurements has long been an important issue for accounting standard setters, academics, and professionals. Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 157 "Fair Value Measurements" provides implementation guidance for the measurements of assets and liabilities at fair value through a hierarchical framework and proposes that "the fair value hierarchy gives the highest priority to quoted prices (unadjusted) in active market for identical assets or liabilities (Level 1) and the lowest priority to unobservable inputs (Level 3)". However, if the market for the underlying asset is inactive, FAS 157 allows managers to use their discretion and choose either to use models derived from managerial inputs (level 3) or market inputs (level 2) to value the assets and liabilities. Laux and Leuz (2009) note that the flexibility to use discretion in fair value accounting choices may be particularly relevant during periods of financial crisis. Ryan (2008) further contends that,
"While Level 2 inputs generally are preferred to Level 3 inputs, FAS 157 does not necessarily require firms to use Level 2 inputs over Level 3 inputs. Firms should use the assumptions that market participants would use in pricing the asset or liability. When markets are illiquid, firms can make the argument that available Level 2 inputs are of such low quality that market participants would use Level 3 inputs instead."
1 Although managers may have an information advantage over an inactive market and incorporate private information through managerial input models, they also have incentives to impose biased model assumptions during the valuation process. In this paper, we examine whether fair values based on managerial inputs are more useful for 1 In light of the financial crisis that began in 2007, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) released staff position papers FAS 157-3 and 157-4, recognizing that additional guidance is required for the adoption of fair value accounting during periods when a market is not active, or the transactions associated with an asset or liability are not orderly. Consistent with the conjectures in Ryan (2008) , the FASB acknowledged that "multiple valuation techniques" might be the most appropriate way to determine fair values, and that the determination of prices and market conditions used to generate prices "depends on the facts and circumstances and requires the use of significant judgment." decision making than fair values based on market inputs, particularly when the market for the underlying assets or liabilities is inactive.
While most academic research 2 and media attention focuses on aggregate values of assets and liabilities measures at fair value, managers make valuation and accounting decisions at the transaction/instrument level. Consequently, it is difficult to disentangle the impact of the aggregation of heterogeneous instruments when trying to reach conclusions about the decision usefulness of fair values using market inputs or managerial inputs.
Additionally, decision usefulness is often operationalized as the market's response to fair value measurements. Market responses to fair value measurements can be the result of the characteristics of the instrument, or the accounting and valuation choices made by management, which can also be difficult to isolate and identify.
To address our research question, we examine one specific financial instrument, Mortgage Servicing Rights (MSRs), and compare the financial reporting characteristics of MSRs classified as Level 2 assets with those of Level 3 assets. Mortgage servicing is the act of keeping a mortgage loan current, including collecting current and overdue payments, forwarding payments to the actual mortgage holder, and making any property tax and insurance payments related to the mortgaged property. Servicing may be performed by the originator of the mortgage, or the original lender may sell the right to service, an MSR, to another lender. The servicing activity is a source of income and cash flows for the service provider and the estimation of these future cash flows will ideally be reflected in the value of the MSR at the balance sheet date. Current accounting rules require that MSRs are initially measured at fair value and subsequently measured at either the lower of amortized cost or market, or fair value. While the size of the MSR market is non-trivial (exceeding $60 billion in 2009), the market is not an active one, with very few trades each quarter. Because of the infrequent trading, virtually all MSR fair values are determined using a DCF model. Some models are derived using only market-observable inputs, while others incorporate manager's private information and other unobservable data. Consequently, mortgage servicing rights are classified as either Level 2 or Level 3 fair value assets under the SFAS 157 hierarchy.
Based on the information provided in banks' regulatory filings and their 10-Q and 10-K reports from 2008 to 2011, we collect the fair value of the MSRs for 82 bank-holding companies (978 bank-quarters) and identify the servicing revenue generated each quarter from these MSRs. 3 We start the sample period from 2008 because FAS 157 is effective for all fiscal periods beginning after November 15, 2007. Most of the bank-holding companies in our sample (62 out of 82 banks) always classify their mortgage servicing rights as Level 3 assets over the entire four-year period, indicating that these banks use managerial inputs to estimate the fair value of MSRs. However, we also find that 20 banks classify their MSRs as Level 2 assets for at least one quarter, indicating these banks contend to rely solely on market-observable inputs for MSR valuation 4 .
Before comparing the quality of the Level 2 fair value with that of the Level 3 fair value, we first examine the determinants of Level 2 versus Level 3 classification for MSRs in a given quarter. We document that the choice to account for MSRs as Level 3 is positively associated with bank-level foreclosure activity of the servicing portfolios, and state-wide subprime lending activity. The Level 3 choice is also negatively associated with changes in state-level housing prices. Since banks, especially smaller regional banks, tend to service loans originated in the local market, these results suggest that banks that choose 3 Although our sample is small, these 82 banks comprise over 85% of the U.S. market for mortgage servicing rights.
4 Thirteen banks always classify their MSR assets as Level 2 for the entire four-year period.
Level 3 fair value have riskier underlying mortgage servicing portfolios. 5 We also find that Level 3 classification is more likely to be chosen by larger banks with Big Four auditors, and banks that choose to value their MSRs on an ongoing fair value basis. We do not find any association between lower accounting quality and the Level 2 versus Level 3 classification choice.
The fair value of the MSRs is calculated as the sum of the discounted expected future cash flows, where the majority of the future cash flows are based on a percentage of the outstanding principal balances. Thus, the most important risks associated with
MSRs are mortgage defaults and prepayment/refinancing activity (Brown et al, 1992 , Lin et al, 2006 . Since both risk factors negatively affect the persistence of the underlying cash flows, we also use the persistence of the servicing fees as a summary measure of the riskiness of the underlying mortgage servicing rights. The prices of the mortgage servicing assets are usually quoted as a multiple of its contractual servicing revenue.
Similar to other financial instruments, the valuation multiple is higher when the underlying assets are less risky. Thus, we test our research question by examining which MSR fair value (Level 2 or Level 3) better reflects the risk characteristics of the underlying servicing portfolio, which are proxied by the persistence of the servicing fees, the foreclosure risk of the servicing portfolio, and the state-level refinancing risk. Based on the results from our choice model, we control for significant differences between the Level 2 and Level 3 samples. Level 2 MSR banks are much smaller than Level 3 MSR banks, virtually all Level 2 MSR banks (except for one) value their MSR assets on a lower of cost or market basis and Level 2 banks appear to conduct business in areas with 5 Fifty-two percent of our sample firms disclose sources of changes in mortgage servicing rights during a given year. Based on the available disclosures, more than 95% of the servicing rights are derived from loans originated but subsequently sold with servicing rights retained.a more stable housing market. Therefore, in addition to comparing the Level 2 MSR banks with the full sample of the Level 3 MSR banks, we also compare Level 2 MSR banks with Level 3 MSR banks that are of similar size, that use the lower of cost or market valuation option, and that are in areas with similar housing markets. Consistent with the results from the Probit model, we find the persistence of servicing fee revenues is higher for Level 2 MSRs than Level 3 MSRs on average. However, the difference in the servicing fee persistence is not significant after matching Level 2 banks with Level 3 banks on the accounting choices, size, and regional housing-market conditions, suggesting the above factors successfully control for the riskiness of the servicing portfolios.
Our main test results suggest that Level 3 fair values better reflect the risk characteristics of the underlying servicing portfolios. Specifically, we find that the MSR valuation multiple based on Level 3 fair value is positively associated with persistence of the servicing fees and negatively associated with proxies for default risk and prepayment risk. We do not find the valuation multiple based on Level 2 fair value reflects the risk characteristics of the underlying servicing portfolios. We also find that the above results hold for both recession and post-recession period.
These results suggest that, when an asset is infrequently traded, fair values based on market inputs may not reflect the underlying cash flows. Instead, fair values based on managerial inputs incorporate firm-specific information more effectively, and better reflect the underlying economic characteristics of the assets/liabilities. We believe these findings are particularly relevant to the ongoing debate about the role of fair value accounting in financial reporting and valuation. A study of a particular asset class such as MSRs provides the benefit of examining a single type of asset rather than looking at an aggregation of assets that may be subject to different valuation models or techniques.
Unlike marketable securities which generate cash flows upon sale or the receipt of interest or dividends, the MSR is not a "passive" asset; the servicing is an activity performed by the banks which generates cash flows that are relatively more predictable than those related to other assets. Our findings suggest that the quality of the fair value inputs does differ across the levels of the hierarchy. However, contrary to some arguments contending that fair values based on managerial inputs are less informative and more biased than fair values based on market inputs, we provide evidence that there are instances where the unobserved Level 3 valuation inputs are more reflective of the economic attributes of the underlying assets than the observable Level 2 inputs, consistent with the conjectures in Ryan (2008) . This distinction appears to be particularly relevant when investors have incomplete information about the economic attributes of the underlying assets or related assets.
The remainder of this paper continues as follows; section 2 provides some background information about fair value accounting and mortgage servicing rights.
Section 3 describes our sample and the research methods. We provide the results of our analyses in Section 4 and conclude in section 5.
Background and Research Question

Fair Value Accounting and SFAS 157
Much of the debate surrounding the use of fair values has been centered on the perceived reliability of these measures. Muller (1998) examines acquired brand names, measured at fair values, by U.K. firms and provides evidence that reliability may be compromised by managers trying to meet certain contracting incentives. Aboody et al (1998) examine the relationship between revaluations of fixed assets in the UK and changes in future performance and conclude that a significant positive association is indicative of the reliability of the revaluation amounts. Following a suggestion by Sloan (1998) that "ex-post realizations […] should correspond more closely to the attributes being estimated," Dietrich et al (2001) document that on average, fair value estimates are lower than actual selling prices, but are more accurate than historical costs for UK investment properties. They find evidence that managers will exert opportunistic discretion over reported fair value estimates, but that the reliability of these estimates is improved in the presence of external monitors. However, Cotter and Richardson (2002) document that in a sample of Australian asset revaluations, firms were more likely to engage the board of directors than an outside appraiser when investment and intangible assets were subject to revaluation, consistent with insiders having greater expertise related to firm-specific assets. They also did not document a difference in reliability for these types of assets between independent appraisers and internal appraisers. While these studies provide evidence that current values provided some information to the market, they also provide some evidence consistent with the concerns of those that oppose the use of fair values, mainly that they are more likely to be subjected to opportunistic choices by managers, especially when they are internally generated measures.
In conjunction with the growing use of fair values in financial statements, the 157-3 emphasizes that while managers may use models and unobservable inputs, they must incorporate the information contained in market prices, and also hold that illiquid markets may not be a sufficient reason to deviate from the use of market prices. As contended in Laux and Leuz (2010) , "The fundamental difficulty here is that managers have an information advantage over auditors and regulators, which in turn makes it difficult to write and enforce accounting standards that both provide flexibility when it is needed and also constrain managers' behavior where flexibility can be used opportunistically."
The majority of the academic research related to SFAS 157 has focused on the value relevance for stock prices of information reported in the hierarchical framework. In their review paper, Maines and Wahlen (2006) cite work by Barth (1991) and Choi 
Mortgage Servicing Rights
Mortgages are serviced when banks engage in activities that keep mortgage loans current, including collecting payments of principal and interest, forwarding payments to the mortgage holder if the holder is not the servicer, and making all necessary tax and insurance payments on the mortgaged property. The right to service the mortgage may be retained by the original lender, or may be sold to another party. Consequently, the servicing right is an asset that can be valued separately from the related mortgage loan.
Typically, for conventional servicing, the servicing fee is about 25 basis points of the balance of the underlying loan [Aldrich et al (2001)] 7 . An MSR asset is recognized if the benefit associated with servicing exceeds "adequate compensation," defined as the amount needed to fairly compensate another servicer. The use of fair values to measure MSRs is not without controversy. Emrick (2006) expressed concerns that SFAS 156 would decrease the usefulness of financial reports because reliability and comparability would be compromised as a result of the fair value measurements. However, they also noted that the fair value option provides symmetrical treatment for MSRs and hedges, reducing the volatility in earnings that occurs in hedge relationships that do not qualify for hedge accounting. SFAS 157 provided additional guidance for firms that were using fair values to determine the value of MSRs on their balance sheet.
The market for MSRs is substantial (over $60 billion at the end of 2009) and highly concentrated, with the top ten servicers holding 60% of the market share (Urumoglu [2010] ). However, trades within this market are very scarce. Based on the infrequent trading, MSRs are classified by mortgage servicers as either Level 2 or Level 3 assets. Those that determine the MSR value with a Level 2 classification could (1) use a DCF model based on inputs observable to the market, or (2) value the assets based on the most recent trades in the MSR market or (3) mark to the interest-only strip receivable (IO) market as the underlying fundamentals of the MSR and the IO are very similar, meeting the conditions specified for an L2 classification. 9 Seventy-five percent of Level 2 banks in our sample disclose that they use a DCF model with observable inputs to value the MSRs. Observable inputs include projected prepayment rates and discount rates, which reflect the future cash flow uncertainty related to default and prepayment activities and a liquidity premium. Banks gather these market inputs from a variety of sources, There is very little research examining the accounting and valuation issues surrounding MSRs. Pfeiffer (1998) examines MSRs during the period when originated and purchased MSRs had different accounting treatment, and documents that even though originated MSRs were "off-balance sheet" and expensed as incurred, they were still priced by investors. Pfeiffer (1998) also found evidence that banks were engaging in MSR sales to record discretionary gains that would offset operating losses, providing managers with an opportunity to manage earnings. Aldrich et al (2001) examine the valuation methods and techniques associated with MSRs, relative to the IO market. They document that the spread between the IO market and the MSR market fluctuates substantially over their measurement period (1998) (1999) (2000) . They also document that the valuation of MSRs is significantly influenced by the precision of the prepayment model.
However, it important to note that this study was completed before the passage of SFAS 140 and 156. We believe that the recent changes in the accounting treatment for MSRs, the variation in the fair value accounting treatment (Level 2 versus Level 3), including the predominant use of DCF models by Level 2 versus management-influenced models . Finally, the availability of both firm-level and macro-level data enables us to examine the relationship between valuations generated by Level 2 and Level 3 models and the associated risk factors.
Research Question
We examine whether Level 3 fair values better reflect the economic characteristics of the underlying servicing portfolios than Level 2 fair values for mortgage servicing rights. 
Sample and Research Method
Sample
Our sample is drawn from the regulatory report (Y-9C) of bank holding 10 Revenues from servicing follow a "cash flow" process. The remittance agreement between the servicer and the mortgage acquirer determines the flow, as most agreement are based on actual payments from the homeowner to the servicer. Traditional agreements do not require the servicer to make upfront payments of interest and principal to the acquirer. identify all banks with non-zero mortgage servicing assets/liabilities. We then read these banks' 10-K and 10-Q reports filed with the SEC to identify whether banks report their mortgage servicing assets/liabilities as Level 2 or Level 3, and collect information disclosed by the banks about amortization costs, fair value adjustments, prepayment rates and discount rates. We also collect information about the amount of servicing revenue generated by the MSRs for each bank-quarter through the SEC filings. We identify 82 unique bank holding companies, all of which report mortgage servicing rights as net disclose that they value the MSR assets using a discounted future cash flow model with market inputs. Two banks disclose that they either use discounted future cash flows with market inputs or market quotes, whichever is more appropriate. The remaining three companies do not disclose the specific type of the market inputs.
Research Design
We first use the following Probit model to investigate why some banks classify 
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There is no readily available measure for the liquidity of the MSR market. Since the revenue generated from the MSR assets is similar to an Interest Only strip receivable, we contend that the bond market liquidity is likely to be more relevant than the equity market liquidity.
bank adopts fair value reporting for its MSRs and 0 if a bank adopts lower of cost or market reporting for its MSRs. We use FVBV to capture the importance of the valuation of MSRs from a financial reporting perspective. As MSRs become more important, we expect that banks are more likely to report MSRs as Level 3 assets if concerns about market inputs outweigh the benefits of Level 2 reporting. We measure SIZE as the natural log of total assets. Since banks often hire an independent consulting company to value the MSRs, we expect larger banks are more likely to be able to bear the model valuation costs as explained in Emrick (2006) and therefore SIZE should be positively associated with LEVEL. One concern often expressed about fair value accounting that is marked to model is that it provides managers with opportunities to manipulate asset values and the related gains and losses, and potentially manage their earnings reports. We include AQ_RANK, measured as the quintile rank of the estimated coefficient (β1) of the following regression CHARGEt+1 = β0 + β1 PROVISIONt + εt. This regression is estimated for firm i quarter t using the information of from quarter t-8 to t. As is in Altamuro and Beatty (2010) , the relationship between the loan loss provision and next period charge-offs serves as a measure of loan-loss provision validity. If managers are choosing L3 classification to manage earnings, we would expect that choice to be associated with a less valid loan-loss provision. Finally, we include an indicator variable which equals 1 for banks with big four auditors and 0 otherwise. We do not have a signed prediction for this variable because, while big auditors may prefer a verifiable measure (level 2), they also have the resources and expertise to audit a more complex discounted cash flow model with managerial inputs.
After investigating the determinants of the level classification, we use equation (2) to examine the persistence of the mortgage servicing fees to learn more about the characteristics of the MSR assets, where Servicing Feei,t is the servicing revenue earned by bank i for quarter t.
14 Servicing Feei,t+1 = β0 + β1 Servicing Feei,t + β2 SIZEi,t + εi,t
We use the estimated servicing fee persistence as a summary measure of the riskiness of the underlying servicing portfolios. A more persistent stream of serving revenue suggests that the MSR assets are less affected by foreclosures and prepayments, which represent less risk for the MSR assets. Since the variables measuring the risk characteristics of the underlying servicing portfolios are not perfect in equation (1), we use the estimated servicing fee persistence to corroborate the estimation results in the Probit model. If the results from the Probit model suggest that the servicing portfolios for Level 2 MSR is less (more) risky, we would expect the service fee generated by Level 2 MSRs to be more (less) persistent.
We use the following two equations to examine whether the fair value measurements reflects the risk characteristics of the underlying MSR assets.
MSRi,t = γ0 + γ1 Servicing Feei,t + γ2 SIZEi,t + γ3 Beta_Ranki + γ4 Beta_Ranki * Servicing Feei,t + εi,t (3)
MSRi,t = δ0 + δ1 Servicing Feei,t + δ2 SIZEi,t + δ3 REFI_RISKi,t + δ4 FORE_RISKi,t + δ5 REFI_RISKit * Servicing Feei,t + δ6 FORE_RISKit * Servicing Feei,t + εi,t (4)
Where Beta_Rank is the quartile rank variable of the persistence of the net servicing fee estimated for each bank following equation (2). 15 We use the rank variable to minimize the estimation noise. For a fair value measurement that represents the economic substance of the underlying mortgage assets, we expect to observe higher valuation multiples for less risky servicing portfolios. Specifically, we expect to find higher 14 Buttimer and Lin (2005) explain that MSR servicers incur significant upfront costs building computing and customer-service infrastructure. The costs of servicing and the "adequate compensation" are mainly fixed. Therefore, expected future servicing revenue is the most important valuation factor.
15
We require at least 8 quarterly observations to estimate bank-specific servicing fee persistence.
valuation multiples for more persistent revenue streams (γ4 >0). We also expect to find lower valuation multiples for servicing portfolios with higher prepayment risk (δ5 <0) and higher default risk (δ6 <0). We estimate equations (3) and (4) for the Level 2 and Level 3 subsamples separately, and then test whether the estimated γ4, δ5, and δ6 coefficients are different across the two samples. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics about our sample. We find that firms that classify their MSRs as Level 3 assets tend to hold riskier portfolios both on the balance sheet and off the balance sheet. For example, the average loan loss provision (PROV) for Level 3 banks is 24.89% compared with 15.02% for Level 2 banks, suggesting Level 3 banks hold riskier loans on their balance sheet. We find 0.85% of residential loans serviced by Level 3 banks are in foreclosure, which is significantly higher than 0.14% serviced by Level 2 banks. In addition, Level 3 banks are located in states with a steeper drop in housing prices (lower HPI), a higher number of subprime mortgages right before the crisis period, and slightly lower refinancing activity. Since the majority of the servicing portfolios come from loans originated by the bank, especially for smaller banks, the above findings suggest that Level 3 servicing portfolios have a higher default risk on average if small banks are more likely to originate local loans. For variables that capture incentives for accounting choices, we find Level 3 banks have a larger amount of MSRs as a percentage of total assets and are more likely to adopt the fair value option for their MSRs, suggesting that the MSR valuation is more important for these banks. We find Level 3 banks are much larger (as measured by asset size) and are more likely to have
Empirical Results
Descriptive Analysis
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For presentation and interpretation clarity, we run the regressions for the two subsamples separately. We obtain the same results if we estimate the regressions for the pooled sample with three-way interaction terms.
one of the big four auditors, suggesting Level 3 banks have more resources to measure the fair value for sophisticated financial instruments. Finally, we find the accounting quality (measured by the ability of the loan loss provision to predict future write-offs) for Level 3 banks is higher than that for Level 2 banks.
We provide Spearman rank correlations of our variables of interest in Table 2 .
Similar to the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 , we find the level choice is positively correlated with number of subprime loans (ρ=0.23), size (ρ=0.31) and choice of the big four auditors (ρ=0.35) and negatively correlated with changes in housing price index (ρ=-0.18). We also find that larger banks report higher loan loss provisions, have more serving assets, are more likely to use fair value option for their servicing assets, and serve more loans that are in the process of foreclosure. We find the correlations between changes in the housing price index and number of subprime loans (ρ=-0.30) and loan loss provisions (ρ=-0.21) to be significantly negative, suggesting loans originated in states with steeper housing price drops have higher credit risk. We find the correlation between HPI and REFI_RISK to be significantly negative, suggesting states with steeper housing price drops also have more refinancing activity. Finally, we find that the indicator variable for fair value adoption is significantly positively correlated with the probability of the Level 3 classification and choice of big four auditors.
Determinants of Level 2 versus Level 3 classification
In 
Persistence of servicing fees for Level 2 and Level 3 MSRs
We use the persistence of servicing fees associated with the MSR assets as a summary measure of the underlying riskiness of the servicing portfolio and report the regression results in Table 4 . Column (1) reports regression results for equation (2) for the full sample. Since regression results from Table 3 suggest that both bank characteristics and the risk characteristics of the underlying servicing portfolios affect the fair value level classification, we also match Level 2 banks with Level 3 banks on dimensions such as fair value option choice, geographic location, and size and report regression results in column (2), (3), and (4). For the full sample, we find that servicing fees generated by Level 2 MSRs are highly persistent. For example, the estimated coefficient of β1 is 0.6482 for Level 2 MSRs, significantly higher than zero (p-value = 0.0001). We find the estimated coefficient for the interaction term LEVEL* Servicing fee to be -0.2776 but not statistically significant (p-value = 0.1235), suggesting the cash flow persistency for Level 3 MSRs is not statistically different from that for the Level 2
MSRs.
To control for the accounting choice between fair value option and the lower of cost or market option, we restrict the regression analysis to the sub-sample that only adopt lower of cost or market valuation option and report the results in Table 4 MSRs are similar after matching on the above three dimensions.
Comparison between Level 2 and Level 3 MSR fair values
We report our first set of main tests in Table 5 , where we examine which fair value for MSRs better reflect the persistence of the underlying cash flow process. If the MSR asset value represents the economic substance of the underlying cash flow process, we expect the valuation multiple to be positively associated with the persistence of the cash flows (γ4>0). That is, we expect a higher valuation multiple for less risky cash flows. Table 5 Column (1) . 17 We also show that the difference between the two samples are not driven by the difference in the underlying service portfolios because Table (4) Column (4) shows that the persistence of servicing fee is the same across the two samples after matching on lower of costs or market valuation choice, HPI, and size. We contend that this finding provides direct evidence of the conjectures made in Ryan (2008), that certain unobservable managerial inputs may be of higher quality and more useful that observable market inputs.
As a supplemental analysis, we consider the impact of disclosures on the financial characteristics of MSR reporting. In Table 5 , Panel B, we find that only banks that disclose prepayment and discount rate assumptions in their annual report generate MSR fair value measurements that are statistically positively associated with the persistence of cash flows. The result is consistent with the argument that banks that choose more transparent financial reporting through additional disclosures tend to generate more reliable fair value measures based on managerial inputs.
We report our second set of main tests in Table 6 , where we examine which fair value for MSRs better reflect the prepayment risk and default risk of the underlying service portfolios. We use the state-level refinancing activity to capture the prepayment risk (REFI_RISK). We use percentage of loans serviced in foreclosure to capture default risk (FORE_RISK). If the MSR fair value measurement reflects the risk characteristics,
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We obtain the same results if we combine the two subsamples and run pooled regressions with three-way interactions. Moreover, we find that the three-way interaction term is significantly positive, suggesting Level 3 fair value is statistically more sensitive to the risk characteristics of the underlying service portfolios than Level 2 fair value.
we expect to find both δ5 and δ6 to be significantly negative in equation (4). Table 6 , Column (1) documents that for Level 2 banks, the estimated coefficient is -2.0351 (p- Table 6 Panel A are consistent with the results reported in Table 5 Panel A and suggest that fair value based on managerial inputs better reflects the risk characteristics of the underlying servicing portfolios. Table 6 Panel B reports the regression results of equation (4) partitioning the Level 3 banks based on whether they disclose prepayment rates and discount rates in the annual reports filed to the SEC. We find results consistent with the argument that banks that disclosure the firm-specific modeling inputs generate better fair value measurements.
Robustness Tests
Our sample period consists of both a recession period 2008-2009 and a postrecession period 2010-2011. Since both the MSR market liquidity and the incentives to provide informative managerial estimates might be different across the two periods, we also examine our research question and conduct the main tests for the two periods separately. We find that, on average, both the servicing fee persistency and the MSR valuation multiple increases from the recession period to the post-recession period, consistent with the observation that the servicing portfolio experiences lower default risk and refinancing risk in the post-recession period. However, our results that Level 3 fair value better reflects the risk characteristics hold for both periods.
In our main tests, we only match Level 3 banks with Level 2 banks on the most important dimensions indicated by our determinants model, such as size, geographic location, and adoption of the fair value accounting option. As a robustness check, we also match Level 3 banks with Level 2 banks on alternative firm characteristics such as whether a bank engages a big four auditor. Our results do not change based on this specification. However, the small sample size limits our matching process to at most three factors and it is impractical to conduct propensity score matching based on all available information.
Finally, we explore the sensitivity of our REFI_RISK variable. Rather than measure only in the state where the corporate headquarters are located, we also measure REFI_RISK as a weighted-average of the state-level refinancing rates where the bank has operating activity, proxied by the percentage of branch deposits in that particular state.
We find 30 banks in our sample operate only in home states. Thirty-one banks operate between two and five states with 79% of business conducted in the home states where they have their headquarters. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that refinancing activity in the headquarters' states would capture the relevant refinancing activity. In addition, the correlation between our original REFI_RISK variable measure and this modified REFI_RISK measure is 0.93. We obtain very similar results based on the modified refinancing risk measure.
Conclusions
In this paper, we collect a sample of banks that have mortgage servicing rights subject to Level 2 and Level 3 classification in accordance with the SFAS 157 fair value hierarchy. We examine the financial reporting characteristics of these fair value assets, and whether those characteristics differ across the classification levels. We first examine the determinants of the levels classification, and find evidence that bank size, accounting choice and mortgage risk attributes are associated with the levels classification decision. Through an examination of the persistence of servicing fees and the association between the MSR valuation multiple and underlying mortgage risk factors, we provide evidence that during periods of infrequent trading and market illiquidity, valuations from models that reflect management's input and expertise provide an MSR asset value that is more closely associated with the underlying cash flows. This finding is consistent with conjectures made by Ryan (2008) that a welldeveloped model may provide more useful information to investors than reliance on weaker market inputs.
Additionally, we contend that our study makes a contribution to the literature by thinking about valuation and accounting choices in a way that is similar to the approach taken by managers, at the transaction level. By focusing on one particular type of asset with a discernible cash flow process, we are able to incorporate variables that are directly related to the risks and rewards associated with mortgage servicing rights.
Consequently, we are not making inferences based on an aggregation of heterogeneous risks and processes. By narrowing our focus, we believe that a greater understanding of the managerial decision-making process with respect to fair value accounting can be realized, and that the results of this study will be particularly relevant to the ongoing debate about the role of fair values in financial reporting, and what financial reporting characteristics are necessary to generate decision-useful financial information. Variable definitions: FO RE_ R ISK is the percentage of the residential mortgage serviced for others that are in process of foreclosure, measured for each bank quarter. H P I is the change in housing price index relative to December 2006 measured for each state quarter. REFI_R ISK is the percentage of refinancing loan amounts scaled by total loan amounts, measured for each state year. S UBPRIM E is the quintile rank of the number of subprime mortgages at the end of 2007, measured for each state. P RO V is the provision for loan and lease losses scaled by total interest income measured for each bank quarter. M KT_LIQ is the total trading volume of the bond market scaled by the total trading volume of the bond market in December 2007, measured for each month. SIZ E is the natural log of beginning total assets, measured for each bank quarter. M S R /T A is the fair value of the mortgage servicing right at the end of the fiscal quarter scaled by total assets. FVBV is an indicator variable that equals one if a company chooses the fair value reporting option for its MSRs. A Q is the quintile rank of the estimated coefficient (β1) of the following regression CHARGEt+1 =β0 +β1PROVISIONt+εt. This regression is estimated for firm i quarter t using the information from quarter t-8 to t. B IG 4 is an indicator variable equal to 1 for banks that use big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise. ( (11) 1.00 0 .14 BIG4 (12) 1.00 Numbers in bold indicates 1% level of significance.
Variable definitions: L EVEL is an indicator variable that equals 1 for bank-quarters reporting MSRs as level 3 assets and 0 for bank-quarters reporting MSRs as level 2 assets. FO RE_ R ISK is the percentage of the residential mortgage serviced for others that are in process of foreclosure, measured for each bank quarter. REFI_R ISK is the percentage of refinancing loan amounts scaled by total loan amounts, measured for each state year. H P I is the changes in housing price index relative to December 2006 measured for each state quarter. S UBPRIM E is the natural log of number of subprime mortgages at the end of 2007, measured for each state. P RO V is the provision for loan and lease losses scaled by total interest income measured for each bank quarter. M KT_LIQ is the total trading volume of the bond market scaled by the total trading volume of the bond market at the end of 2007, measured for each month. M S R /T A is the fair value of the mortgage servicing right at the end of the fiscal quarter scaled by total assets, measured for each bank quarter. SIZ E is the natural log of beginning total assets, measured for each bank quarter. FVBV is an indicator variable that equals one if a company chooses the fair value reporting option for its MSRs. A Q is the quintile rank of the estimated coefficient (β1) of the following regression CHARGEt+1 =β0 +β1PROVISIONt+εt. This regression is estimated for firm i quarter t using the information from quarter t-8 to t. B IG 4 is an indicator variable equal to 1 for banks that use big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions: L EVEL is an indicator variable that equals 1 for bank-quarters reporting MSRs as level 3 assets and 0 for bank-quarters reporting MSRs as level 2 assets. FO RE_ R ISK is the percentage of residential mortgage serviced for others that are in process of foreclosure, measured for each bank quarter. REFI_R ISK is the percentage of refinancing loan amounts scaled by total loan amounts, measured for each state year. S UBPRIM E is the quintile rank of the number of subprime mortgages at the end of 2007, measured for each state. P RO V is the provision for loan and lease losses scaled by total interest income measured for each bank quarter. H P I is the changes in housing price index relative to December 2006 measured for each state quarter. M KT_LIQ is the total trading volume of the bond market scaled by the total trading volume of the bond market at the end of 2007, measured for each month. M S R /T A is the fair value of the mortgage servicing right at the end of the fiscal quarter scaled by total assets, measured for each bank quarter. SIZ E is the natural log of beginning total assets, measured for each bank quarter. FVBV is an indicator variable that equals one if a company chooses the fair value reporting option for its MSRs. A Q is the quintile rank of the estimated coefficient (β1) of the following regression CHARGEt+1 = β0 + β1 PROVISIONt + εt . This regression is estimated for firm i quarter t using the information from quarter t-8 to t. B IG 4 is an indicator variable equal to 1 for banks that use big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise. Notes: Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients for equation (2) . Column (1) reports regression results for the full sample. Column (2) reports regression results based on subsample of L2 and L3 banks that adopt lower of costs or market reporting for their MSR assets. Column (3) reports regression results matching L2 banks with L3 banks on the lower of costs or market accounting choice and the geographic locations. Column (4) reports regression results matching L2 banks with L3 banks on the lower of costs or market accounting choice, the state-level house price index, and size. ***, **, * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Two-tailed p-values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at bank level.
Variable definitions: Servic in g F e e is the servicing revenue generated from the MSR assets scaled by the beginning total assets. S ize is the natural log of beginning total assets. Level equals 1 for level 3 MSRs and 0 for level 2 MSRs.
L2
(1 Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients for equation (3). Panel A Column (1) reports regression results for the level 2 banks. Panel A Column (2) reports regression results for all level 3 banks. Panel A Column (3) reports results for the subsample of level 3 banks that adopt lower of costs or market reporting for their MSR assets. Panel A Column (4) reports regression results for the subsample of level 3 banks that are matched with level 2 banks on the lower of costs or market accounting choice and geographic location. Panel A Column (5) reports regression results for the subsample of level 3 banks that are matched with level 2 banks on the lower of costs or market accounting choice, the state-level house price index, and size. ***, **, * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Two-tailed p-values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level.
M S R is the fair value of mortgage servicing right scaled by the beginning balance of total assets. Servicing Fee is the servicing fee generated from the servicing assets scaled by beginning total assets. Size is the natural log of total assets. Beta_Rank is the quartile rank variable of the persistence of the servicing fee estimated for each bank following equation (2).
( Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients for equation (4). Panel A Column (1) reports regression results for the level 2 banks. Panel A Column (2) reports regression results for all level 3 banks. Panel A Column (3) reports results for the subsample of level 3 banks that adopt lower of costs or market reporting for their MSR assets. Panel A Column (4) reports regression results for the subsample of level 3 banks that are matched with level 2 banks on the lower of costs or market accounting choice and geographic location. Panel A Column (5) reports regression results for the subsample of level 3 banks that are matched with level 2 banks on the lower of costs or market accounting choice, the state-level house price index, and size. ***, **, * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Two-tailed p-values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level.
M S R is the fair value of mortgage servicing right scaled by the beginning balance of total assets. Servicing Fee is the servicing fee generated from the servicing assets scaled by beginning total assets. FO RE_RISK is the percentage of residential mortgage serviced for others that are in process of foreclosure, measured for each bank quarter. Size is the natural log of total assets. REFI_RISK is the state-level refinancing rate, which is measured for each state-year as the amount of loans approved for refinancing purpose divided by total amount of loans approved.
